We show that adverse selection in the labor market may generate negative assortative matching of workers and …rms. In a model in which employers asymmetrically learn about the ability of their workers, high-productivity …rms poach mediocre workers, whereas low-productivity …rms retain high-ability workers. We show that this ‡ip-ping property is caused by information asymmetry alone. Our model has a number of positive and normative predictions: External promotions are not an indication of high talent, within-job wage growth is higher in industries with more revenue dispersion, and non-compete clauses are ine¢ cient in industries with signi…cant …rm heterogeneity.
Introduction
If …rms can only learn about the talent of their workers by observing them on the job, initial matches of …rms and workers can be ine¢ cient. After learning occurs, market forces may reallocate workers across …rms. We show that if …rms have an informational advantage when learning about their own workers, then worker ‡ows tend to exacerbate ine¢ ciencies associated with initial allocations. That is, adverse selection prevents the positive assortative matching of workers and …rms: High-productivity …rms poach mediocre workers, whereas low-productivity …rms retain high-ability workers. We thus say that the equilibrium has a ‡ipping property.
Our model belongs to the asymmetric employer learning literature, which was initiated by Waldman (1984) and Greenwald (1986) . In such models, the current employer learns about the talent of her incumbent workers, while competing employers remain uninformed.
This form of information asymmetry implies that competitors may learn about a worker's ability from the actions taken by the worker's employer, such as decisions involving promotion, retention, and termination. These models typically assume that workers accumulate …rm-speci…c skills over time and are thus more valuable to their incumbent …rms than to competing …rms. 1 We depart from the existing literature by introducing a speci…c form of …rm heterogeneity:
Some …rms are more productive/pro…table than others.
2 This feature allows us to study worker poaching and job mobility in equilibrium. Initial allocations of workers to …rms may turn out to be ine¢ cient, because they happen without any knowledge of workers'abilities.
When initial allocations are ine¢ cient, our question is the following: Do market forces eliminate or exacerbate ine¢ ciencies? Under symmetric learning (and supermodularity of …rm and worker qualities), we obtain the standard result that the best …rms are indeed matched with the best workers in equilibrium, i.e., there is positive assortative matching of workers and …rms. By contrast, in an equilibrium with asymmetric employer learning, the socially optimal allocation of talent cannot generally be attained: There is either too much or too little job mobility in equilibrium, or both.
To understand the consequences of asymmetric information for the matching of …rms and workers, we …rst consider the problem of a social planner. The social planner decides whether a worker stays with her current employer or leaves for a more productive …rm.
The planner faces no constraints on transfers and actions, but does not know the worker's talent, which is only known by the current employer. To induce the employer to truthfully reveal information about the worker's talent, the planner designs a mechanism that forces the …rm to pay a ‡at fee (which can be interpreted as a wage) for all types of workers that are retained. This ‡at-fee scheme is the only schedule that is incentive compatible.
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Because the …rm pays the same fee regardless of which workers it retains, the …rm retains only workers with talent above a given threshold. Therefore, only the very best workers can be retained. This in turn implies that only mediocre workers can be reassigned to highpro…tability …rms. This leads to a reversal of positive assortative matching. We call such a reversal a ‡ipping property of the equilibrium. The social planner's solution makes it clear that the ‡ipping property is a consequence of asymmetric information alone.
The ‡ipping property implies that matching workers and …rms on the basis of information revealed by …rms is very ine¢ cient. The planner thus prefers to make assignment decisions without using any information revealed by the mechanism. The solution then exhibits either excessive reassignment of mediocre workers or excessive retention of high-talent workers.
In the decentralized competitive equilibrium, which we consider next, both types of ine¢ ciencies may coexist. In equilibrium, the incumbent employer o¤ers the same wage to all retained workers, which implies that the incumbent retains only the most talented workers. Thus, high-pro…tability …rms can only poach mediocre workers. It is rational for high-pro…tability …rms to poach mediocre workers because these workers are better than the unemployed agents.
When solving for the decentralized equilibrium, we assume that contracts that fully bind workers to …rms are not available. We make this assumption because the inalienability of labor is a key di¤erence between labor markets and asset markets. "Excessive mobility" of mediocre workers occurs precisely because workers are free to move. We note, however, that the absence of bonding contracts does not cause the ‡ipping property. The social planner's problem reveals that the ‡ipping property is a consequence of informational asymmetries alone. The absence of bonding contracts simply allows the ‡ipping property to manifest itself in the form of excessive mobility.
Our results may appear surprising in light of the original analysis of markets with asymmetric information by Akerlof (1970) . In a lemons market in which the seller of an asset has private information, there is typically little or no trade. By analogy, one would expect that a labor market in which the current employer knows more about the quality of its worker than a competitor is likely to generate too little "trade," i.e., insu¢ cient worker mobility.
However, this analogy is imperfect for two reasons. First, matching considerations are important in labor markets, implying that low worker mobility is sometimes e¢ cient. Second, workers are not like assets, which can be freely bought and sold. Assuming no slavery, a worker is free to work for the highest bidder, and the current employer typically receives no compensation if the worker is poached by another …rm. In this context, and in contrast with traditional lemons market models, the ‡ipping property typically leads to "too much trade."
Ours is not meant to be a general theory of labor markets. We expect our analysis to be relevant to those industries in which incumbent employers enjoy a natural advantage in discovering talent. Examples that …t such a description include innovative industries, such as information technology, and some sectors of the …nancial industry, such as asset management.
In those cases, our model has distinctive empirical predictions. For example, in a model with symmetric learning and matching, people who are "externally promoted" (i.e., those who leave their jobs to move to higher-ranking positions in other …rms) are typically the most talented workers. By contrast, in our model, because learning is asymmetric, externally promoted workers are not the most talented. Consistent with such a prediction, a recent paper by Berk, van Binsbergen, and Liu (forthcoming) , which studies the labor market for mutual fund managers, …nds that internal "promotions" (i.e., when a manager is given control over a larger value of assets) add value to the …rm, whereas external promotions (i.e., external hires with an increase in assets under management) do not.
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Our model also predicts that employee earnings are higher in sectors with greater rev- 4 Berk, van Binsbergen, and Liu (forthcoming) argue convincingly that mutual fund …rms have private information about the skill of their managers. Their evidence shows that this information is used for promotion decisions. Outsiders are informationally disadvantaged because fund portfolio decisions are not disclosed in real time and fund performance alone is a very noisy measure of managerial skill. enue dispersion and, more strikingly, that within-job earnings growth is also higher in such sectors. Consistent with these implications, in their study of the software industry, Andersson et al. (2009) show that the "rewards to loyalty" (i.e., within-job earnings growth for those employees retained by their …rms) are greater in software sectors with high revenue dispersion. By contrast, between-job earnings growth is smaller in such sectors.
Our analysis also yields an important normative conclusion: The desirability of contracts that restrict worker mobility (e.g., non-compete clauses and bonding contracts) may vary across industries depending on the degree of …rm heterogeneity and on the importance of …rm-speci…c skills. Indeed, in some instances, facilitating employee mobility may be socially desirable. This normative conclusion also has some potentially positive predictions: Under the assumption that laws are chosen partly for e¢ ciency reasons, non-compete clauses should be banned in industries where …rm quality is very heterogeneous. Empirically, we observe variation in the enforceability of non-compete clauses across jurisdictions.
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After a brief discussion of the related literature, in Section 2 we present the setup of the model. Section 3 solves the problem of a …nancially unconstrained planner and shows our key result that any incentive-compatible mechanism exhibits a ‡ipping property. In Section 4 we characterize the decentralized labor market equilibrium. We then provide a discussion of the key implications of the model and the empirical evidence supporting them in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
Our paper belongs to the literature on adverse selection initiated by Akerlof (1970) .
Most papers in this literature consider decentralized trading situations in which the buyers' and sellers' valuations are not observable. The focus is usually on the impact of private information about the quality of a good on the occurrence of trade. 6 Here we adopt a similar approach, with similar assumptions. A key di¤erence is that, in our setup, matching is an important consideration; thus, trading gains may not exist for a range of worker types.
5 Non-compete clauses are controversial and have often been challenged in courts. For example, in California, non-compete clauses are considered void and non-enforceable, except in a small set of cases.
6 For example, Ellingsen (1997) shows that there exists a separating equilibrium in which some trade of high-quality goods occurs in lemons markets. Levin (2001) studies how the degree of information asymmetry a¤ects trade. Daley and Green (2012) and Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2015) develop dynamic models of adverse selection and its impact on trade. Bar-Isaac, Jewitt, and Leaver (2014) study how the degree of information asymmetry impacts e¢ ciency when public and private information is multi-dimensional.
Therefore, in contrast to models of asset markets in which there is typically little or no trade, 7 our model shows that, in labor markets, the equilibrium often displays both excessive and insu¢ cient worker mobility.
In the adverse selection literature, the closest paper to ours is Adriani and Deidda (2009) .
They consider a decentralized market in which a low-quality good is more valuable to the seller than to the buyer. They show that the unique equilibrium surviving the D1 re…nement involves no trade. Market breakdown occurs because of an upward pressure on prices for signaling reasons. In our model, trade does not break down because the "asset"traded is an
employee. An employee chooses to work for the …rm with the highest wage o¤er. Because the wage o¤ered to an employee is a cost for the incumbent …rm, the incumbent retains only the best workers at the lowest wage that prevents poaching. However, the incumbent …rm is not able to retain mediocre workers, and therefore, these workers choose to work for a poacher. Hence the decentralized equilibrium displays simultaneously too little trade of the best workers and too much trade of mediocre ones.
Our paper is also related to the literature on matching in labor markets, in particular to models in which information creates matching frictions. Franco, Mitchell, and Vereshchagina (2011) study the problem of designing work teams under moral hazard. They show that, even when technological complementarities favor positive assortative matching, a principal may choose to match high types with low types to save on incentive costs. Negatively sorted teams may thus be a consequence of the need to provide incentives for e¤ort when individual contributions to team output are not observable. Related results can be found in Kaya and Vereshchagina (2015) , who derive new results for teams organized as partnerships, and in Kaya and Vereshchagina (2014) , who derive predictions concerning matching patterns in both corporations and partnerships. The reason for negative assortative matching in these models is very di¤erent from the economic forces in our model. Negative assortative matching arises as an optimal response to the problem of providing incentives under moral hazard.
By contrast, in our model, which is based on hidden information about types, players do not truthfully reveal their types under any mechanism intended to implement a positively assortative matching allocation. Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009) and Kaya (2013) are examples of matching models with two-sided private information. Our model di¤ers from theirs in many aspects, but crucially in that, in our setup, ex post payo¤s are also private information, and thus contracting on payo¤s is not possible.
More narrowly, our model belongs to the labor literature on asymmetric learning. In a seminal paper, Waldman (1984) considers internal job assignment as a signal of employee ability. Homogeneous …rms attempt to poach workers assigned to higher-level jobs by making o¤ers corresponding to workers' expected values. The resulting assignment of workers to jobs is ine¢ cient; employees who would be more productive in higher-level jobs are not promoted. In a related paper, Milgrom and Oster (1987) show that employees whose abilities are observed only by their current employers tend to be promoted less often and paid lower wages than employees whose abilities are visible to other employers. Waldman's promotion model has also been extended by Bernhardt and Scoones (1993) and Bernhardt (1995) to analyze a number of issues, such as turnover, compensation, demotions, and other labor market outcomes.
As in our paper, Greenwald (1986) focuses on the role played by asymmetric information on employee mobility. Employees may leave a …rm either for exogenous reasons or because they are not retained. A key result is that there are few layo¤s among the best workers (who only quit for exogenous reasons), and the stream of people changing jobs thus disproportionately consists of "bad" employees. A key di¤erence in our model is that mobility is always endogenous and driven by …rm heterogeneity. In a related paper, Laing (1994) considers a model in which the decision to retain or …re an employee is a signal of employee ability; however, unlike our paper, …rms are homogeneous and the focus is on the properties of the optimal contract for risk-averse employees. Mukherjee (2008) considers the related problem of designing an optimal disclosure policy when information about a worker's ability may trigger poaching attempts by more productive competitors.
Some papers show that variations of the key assumptions in these models can produce signi…cantly di¤erent results. Ricart I Costa (1988) shows that if workers learn about their abilities and are able to choose from a menu of wage contracts, there is a separating equilibrium that resolves the "lemons" problem in Waldman's (1984) model. In our model, we assume that workers do not know their types, and our main results will hold as long as employers have some informational advantage about some aspects of their workers'abilities. Golan (2005) challenges a di¤erent assumption in Waldman's model: the timing of wage o¤ers. This study shows that if the incumbent always has the option of matching outside o¤ers, e¢ ciency can be restored.
8 Recent work by Waldman and Zax (2016) shows however that Golan's results are not robust; under reasonable assumptions, ine¢ cient equilibria arise even when the incumbent is able to match outside o¤ers.
Another application of asymmetric learning models involves the problem of investing in general and/or …rm-speci…c skills; these models are developed by Waldman (1990), Chang and Wang (1996) , Pischke (1998, 1999) , and Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) , among others.
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More broadly, our paper is related to recent research that also emphasizes the welfare costs of …erce competition for talent, such as Bénabou and Tirole (2016) and Acharya, Pagano and Volpin (2016) . These papers emphasize the deleterious e¤ect that competition for talent can have on incentives (i.e., multitasking and/or project selection issues). By contrast, our focus is on the impact that competition has on how workers are allocated to …rms. More closely related is Terviö (2009) , who also shows that competition for talent creates ine¢ ciencies. In his model, a worker's talent is revealed on the job but -unlike our model -this information is public. Terviö shows that in a competitive labor market, …rms invest too little in talent discovery and over-recruit workers with mediocre abilities.
Finally, our analysis also shares certain ideas found in models of executive markets. As in …rm-CEO assignment models, workers and …rms are heterogeneous (Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier, 2009; Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 2013; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Terviö, 2008) . As in Frydman (2013) and Zabojnik (2004, 2006) , workers are endowed with both …rm-speci…c and general skills. As in Edmans and Gabaix (2011) , the process of matching workers with …rms is distorted by informational frictions. 8 In an earlier paper, Lazear (1986) makes a similar point. 9 There is also an important empirical literature on asymmetric employer learning. Gibbons and Katz (1991) provide empirical evidence that is compatible with the predictions of a model of layo¤s with asymmetric employer learning. Pinkston (2009) constructs a model in which …rms use bidding wars to compete for talent and …nds empirical evidence of substantial asymmetric employer learning. Kahn (2013) also …nds substantial evidence in favor of asymmetric learning. In contrast, Schönberg (2007) …nds little evidence that employer learning is asymmetric.
Model Setup
The economy is populated with a continuum of …rms that live for two periods; in the Internet Appendix, we present a model with in…nitely-lived …rms. Firms can be of one of two types, L or H, and these represent both the type and the mass of …rms of each type. We denote a representative …rm of each type by i 2 fl; hg, which also denotes the value of a pro…tability parameter: Low-pro…tability -L …rms -have parameter l = 1, and high-pro…tability …rms -H …rms -have parameter h = , where > 1. This is the only source of (exogenous) heterogeneity between …rms.
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There is a continuum of agents (i.e., those who can become workers) who live for two periods: young age and old age. At t = 0, a mass M of young agents enter the labor market. At t = 1, a …rm of type i 2 f1; g that successfully retains an incumbent worker of type 10 A mass of …rms with a known common productivity type is sometimes interpreted as "sector,"see, e.g., Gibbons et al (2005) . 11 We assume that workers do not learn anything about for simplicity only. The important assumption here is that a worker learns less about than does her incumbent employer. receives (expected) payo¤ i . We assume that a …rm's payo¤ is not directly observable, and thus remains private information to the …rm. One possibility is that performance is only observed with noise. This could happen for a number of reasons, such as insu¢ cient disclosure, imperfect measurement of the performance of complex tasks, di¢ culties in measuring a worker's individual contribution to the output of a team, or any other similar confounding e¤ects. In all such cases, the …rm may have an informational advantage over outsiders when estimating worker performance, because the …rm can directly observe the worker's actions.
If the …rm loses the incumbent worker, it may replace that worker with either a randomly selected unemployed agent or an incumbent worker poached from another …rm. If …rm i replaces an incumbent worker with an externally-hired worker of type , the …rm's payo¤ is i . Parameter 2 (0; 1) represents the loss in …rm-speci…c skills that results when the incumbent worker is replaced by an outsider. Higher levels of mean that …rm-speci…c skills are less important. Our interpretation is that a worker acquires …rm-speci…c skills after working for a particular …rm in t = 0, and these skills remain valuable at t = 1.
We call the set of unemployed agents available for hire at t = 1 the outside pool. The outside pool is comprised only of old agents who were not employed at t = 0 (this is without loss of generality; in equilibrium, a …rm with a vacancy would never hire a worker who was dismissed by another …rm). If a …rm of type i 2 f1; g hires from the outside pool at t = 1, the …rm's expected payo¤ is i , where is the mean of F (:).
At t = 1, some …rms will have vacancies. For example, if < , a …rm prefers a randomly selected unemployed agent to its incumbent worker, which means that the …rm will …re its incumbent worker and open a vacancy. Firms with vacancies can either hire from the outside pool or try to poach a worker from another …rm.
We are interested in how e¢ ciently vacancies can be …lled. If all …rms were identical, all vacancies should be …lled with workers from the outside pool; poaching workers from other …rms would be ine¢ cient because job mobility destroys …rm-speci…c skills. However, since …rms are heterogeneous -H …rms are more productive than L …rms -and there is a technological complementarity between and i, in some cases it is e¢ cient for H …rms to poach workers from L …rms.
We make the following simplifying assumption:
. This is a su¢ cient, but not necessary, assumption to guarantee that poachable workers are always in "short supply,"which is the most interesting case to analyze.
The Planner' s Problem
We …rst consider the problem of a planner who wants to maximize social surplus. We place no exogenous restrictions on the set of mechanisms that the planner can choose.
Symmetric Information
As a benchmark, we start with the case in which information is symmetric, and thus the planner has the same information that …rms do. In this case the planner can easily implement the …rst-best allocation.
At t = 0, there is no meaningful decision problem; each …rm should hire one worker from the outside pool.
At t = 1, because of …rm-speci…c skills, it is never e¢ cient to reallocate workers from one …rm to another when both …rms are of the same type. Similarly, transferring workers from H …rms to L …rms is always ine¢ cient. Thus, the planner only needs to consider the possibility of transferring workers from L …rms to H …rms.
The planner only needs to consider as potential poachers the set of H …rms with workers with talent below . This is because of Assumption A1. This implies that an H …rm's incumbent worker is retained if , and dismissed otherwise.
We now only need to consider the case of L …rms with incumbent workers. Thus, to simplify the exposition, when solving the planner's problem we refer to an L …rm with an incumbent worker at the beginning of t = 1 as an incumbent …rm, and to H …rms with vacancies (i.e., H …rms with < ) as potential poachers.
To formally study the planner's problem when allocating L …rms'incumbent workers, we …rst introduce some notation and terminology. The planner's problem is to assign incumbent workers to one of three possible sets: P denotes the set of workers who are assigned to a poacher (i.e., an H …rm with a vacancy), R denotes the set of workers who remain with the incumbent …rm, and S denotes the set of workers who are unassigned (i.e., they are "sacked").
De…nition 1 An allocation is a function a ( ) : [0; ] !
2 , where 2 is the standard 2-simplex, that maps a worker of type to a probability distribution fp P ; p R ; p S g, where p i is the probability that the worker is assigned to set i 2 fP; R; Sg.
In other words, we de…ne an allocation as a stochastic assignment rule. The allocation function determines which types of incumbent workers are allocated to L …rms, to H …rms, or to no …rm. In the special case in which the assignment rule is deterministic, we can de…ne an allocation in a more conventional way as a ( ) : [0; ] ! fP; R; Sg. De…nition 1 is however more general.
The net surplus created by a worker of type who is assigned to an incumbent …rm is . Similarly, the net surplus created by a worker of type who is assigned to a poacher is . A social planner who wants to maximize social surplus should (i) replace all workers such that with a randomly selected replacement from the outside pool (whose expected type is ) and (ii) assign worker to a poacher if and only if :
In other words, worker should be matched with a poacher when the incremental surplus to the poacher is larger than the net loss to the incumbent …rm. Condition (1) implies that poaching should occur only if # , where
We call # the critical type: Workers who are more talented than the critical type should be assigned to a poacher, while those less talented than the critical type should be either retained or …red. Clearly, only those workers such that should be …red, which implies that all workers in ; # should be retained. 12 This completes the characterization of the …rst-best allocation a F B ( ), which is given by
Note that the …rst-best allocation is a deterministic assignment rule and displays positive assortative matching: Among those workers initially paired with L …rms, the best workers -those in # ; -are assigned to H …rms, while the mediocre workers -those in ; # -remain with L …rms.
Asymmetric Information
We now consider the case of an informationally constrained social planner: The planner cannot observe the incumbent workers'types. To make information asymmetries relevant, we maintain the assumption that outsiders (including the planner) cannot observe performance outcomes. Clearly, if the …rms'payo¤s were perfectly observable to all, the planner could implement the …rst-best outcome by forcing some L …rms to "integrate"with some H …rms (or write a contract that mimics the integrated solution), thus making both …rms internalize the consequences of their actions. The interesting case is thus the one in which performance information is only partially revealed and integration is not viable. 13 We initially consider the simplest case of full asymmetric information and then, in Subsection 3.3, we analyze the case in which a (noisy) public signal is available.
We assume that the planner can force …rms and workers to participate in any mechanism, and also that the planner can assign workers to …rms in any way she chooses. This assumption implies that even slavery contracts are admissible. 14 Similarly, we assume that the planner faces no constraints on the transfers she can impose on players, e.g., there are no liquidity or budget-balance constraints. Our planner is thus completely unconstrained in her choices and actions; the only endogenous constraint the planner faces is incomplete information about the types of incumbent workers.
As in the case of symmetric information, transferring workers between …rms of the same type, or from H …rms to L …rms, is ine¢ cient. Thus again, here we only consider the possibility of transferring workers from L …rms to H …rms.
Because of Assumption 1, the planner wants to make sure that no H …rm with dismisses its worker. This can be easily accomplished by setting the maximum payo¤ for H …rms who dismiss workers at . Thus, as before, the planner only needs to consider as potential poachers the set of H …rms with workers with talent below .
Let A denote the space of all allocations for workers initially paired with an L …rm. For expositional simplicity, we restrict the space of admissible allocations to A A, which is the space of all allocations for which, for a given b 2 [0; ], p S = 1 for all < b and p S = 0 for all b . Although such a constraint substantially simpli…es the presentation, it has no implications for the analysis, because this constraint is not binding when allocations are chosen optimally. In particular, note that any e¢ cient allocation must belong to A .
Without loss of generality, we can fully represent an allocation in A by a function
, where p ( ) is the probability that worker is assigned to set P .
Henceforth, when there is no possibility of confusion, we will simply refer to p ( ) as an allocation.
De…nition 2 A positive assortative matching (PAM) allocation is an allocation in
, with strict inequality for at least one such pair.
In other words, under a PAM allocation, more talented workers face a higher probability of being assigned to high-pro…tability …rms. A negative assortative matching (NAM ) allocation is de…ned analogously.
A mechanism hp; ti is an allocation rule p ( m ) and a transfer function t ( m ), where m is a message sent by an L …rm. We consider only symmetric mechanisms where the planner o¤ers the same contract to all L …rms. Thus, to simplify notation, we omit …rm subscripts.
The timing is as follows. First, the planner o¤ers (and commits to) a mechanism (i.e., a contract) to each incumbent L …rm. Second, each incumbent …rm sends a message m 2 [0; ]. 15 Third, the allocation is implemented (recall that all types m < b are assigned to S with probability 1).
Let U ( ; m j p; t) denote the payo¤ of an incumbent …rm with type from reporting m under mechanism hp; ti. An allocation p is implementable if there exists at least one transfer function t such that
In other words, p is implementable if there exists at least one transfer function such that truth-telling is incentive compatible.
Our …rst proposition restricts the set of implementable allocations:
], then it must be that 0 < 00 .
Proof. The Revelation Principle implies that there is no loss of generality from focusing on truth-telling direct mechanisms. De…ne an incumbent …rm's payo¤ function under mechanism hp; ti as
(
Note that an implicit assumption here is that a …rm that loses its worker ends up employing a randomly selected worker from the outside pool.
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Suppose that an allocation p with p (
it is incentive compatible for the …rm to report m = ). Incentive compatibility requires
but in this case, if 00 deviates and reports 0 , we have that U ( 00 ; 0 j p; t) U ( 00 ; 00 j p; t)
which implies that p is not incentive compatible. Finally, notice that we cannot have p ( 0 ) > p ( 00 ) for 00 = 0 because p must be a function.
Proposition 1 implies that, if the planner engages in matching based on types (i.e., if p ( 0 ) 6 = p ( 00 ) for some 0 6 = 00 ), only NAM can arise. In other words, incentive compatibility implies that an allocation that matches workers based on their types must exhibit NAM. This is our main result. The analysis in this section reveals that this ‡ipping property is a consequence of asymmetric information alone.
Proposition 1 has a straightforward corollary:
Corollary 1 There is no mechanism that implements a positive assortative matching allocation.
Intuitively, Corollary 1 holds because, under a PAM allocation, the planner has to compensate a …rm that risks losing a high-talent worker with a high monetary transfer to induce this …rm to truthfully reveal the worker's type. If the planner does that, however, then a low-type …rm, which cares less than the high-type …rm about losing its worker, would prefer to pretend to have high type in order to receive a higher transfer.
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By contrast, it is easy to verify that all NAM allocations are implementable.
Another immediate consequence of the ‡ipping property is that the …rst-best allocation is not implementable. From Subsection 3.1, we know that the …rst-best allocation implies
which is a PAM allocation and thus not implementable.
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Although it is not surprising that non-monotonic allocations are not implementable, in our application this leads to an extreme form of ine¢ ciency: Not only the …rst-best allocation is not implementable, but no allocation in which some better workers are more likely to match with better …rms is implementable. That is, allocations in which PAM occurs for only a subset of types are also not implementable. There are no regions for which even imperfect matching can be e¢ ciency enhancing.
Another class of implementable allocations is the set of allocations that exhibit no matching on types:
17 Formally, Corollary 1 holds because all PAM allocations violate the typical monotonicity requirement for implementable decisions (here, for simplicity, we call a decision an allocation) under incomplete information (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p. 260) . 18 More formally, for the non-generic case in which = # , p F B ( ) can be any probability.
Under a matching-free allocation, the planner chooses to ignore the information revealed by the types in [b ; ] when deciding to assign workers to …rms. It is easy to see that matchingfree allocations are also implementable.
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We now consider the optimal mechanisms. We postulate the planner's objective function as
Note that, for simplicity, we assume that the planner only cares about the total surplus created by the allocation of talent, and not about the transfers. The planner maximizes
Proposition 2 The optimal mechanism implements a matching-free allocation p ( ) = c
where
Proof. See the Appendix.
The economic intuition behind Proposition 2 is easier to grasp for the limiting case in which is close to 1 and k 0. Ideally, the planner would like to assign all types in [ ; ] that are higher than the critical type # to an H …rm, and those below to an L …rm. This is however not possible because PAM allocations are not feasible. To see this, suppose …rst that c > 0 and that the planner sets t = 0 for < and t = "; with " > 0, for 2 [ ; ]. All types less than report truthfully because they strictly prefer to replace the worker. All types such that ("=c) + will also report truthfully. As we make " ! 0, all types in [ ; ] report truthfully. If c = 0 instead, then any ‡at transfer implements the allocation. lower than the critical type, all workers in [ ; ] are retained by incumbent L …rms. 20 Proposition 2 implies that the planner has to choose between the lesser of two evils:
The planner either chooses to assign all incumbent workers with types greater than b to L …rms, or chooses to assign all such workers to H …rms. Fine tuning the allocation of talent to e¢ ciently match workers and …rms is not possible. The …rst solution displays ine¢ cient retention of the best workers -workers in # ; are retained but should have been poached.
The second solution displays ine¢ cient poaching of the mediocre workers -workers in ; # are poached but should have been retained, and there is also ine¢ cient …ring of workers in
Remark 1. One straightforward implementation of the optimal mechanism is as follows.
If the planner wants to set c = 0 (all workers in [ ; ] retained), the planner should e¤ectively forbid all poaching -workers should be forced to work for their incumbent …rms.
If instead the planner wants to set c = 1 (all workers in [ ; ] poached), L …rms should be heavily …ned for retaining any worker.
Remark 2. Proposition 2 provides a justi…cation for banning contracts in which …rms own labor -i.e., quasi-slavery contracts. Even if workers voluntarily enter such contracts, these contracts generate externalities because there will be too much retention of high types.
If the planner would like to set c = 1 but can only use regulatory tools, the planner may choose to ban non-compete clauses or other contracts that e¤ectively give incumbent …rms rights to retain their workers under most circumstances.
Remark 3. Under an optimal mechanism, the messages sent by incumbent …rms are only useful for deciding which workers should be …red (i.e., assigned to set S). By assuming alternative technologies with PAM properties, we can construct a variation of the current model in which no one in an L …rm should be …red. In such a model, the ‡ipping property would force the planner to ignore all information revealed by the incumbent under a mechanism, making mechanism design irrelevant.
Public Signals
We have thus far considered the case in which only the incumbent …rm has any information about the talent of a worker. It is natural to ask whether our results, in particular the ‡ipping property, change when the planner also has some information about workers.
Here we consider the case in which a publicly observable (and contractible) signal may reveal some information about . For example, could be a vector of worker characteristics (such as education, experience, etc.). This information could be produced in t = 0 and become publicly available at the beginning of t = 1. In this case, we say that is an ex ante signal: The planner observes the signal before o¤ering a mechanism. Alternatively, could be an observable performance variable, such as a pro…t signal, which is observed only at the end of t = 1. In this case, is an ex post signal, which is observed only after the allocation is implemented.
Ex ante signals pose no additional complications to the analysis. After observing an ex ante signal , the planner will update her belief about the distribution of types; the planner now believes types are distributed according to F . The analysis remains unchanged once F is replaced by F .
Ex post signals, however, expand the set of options available to the planner. Although allocations cannot directly depend on the signal, the transfers can and they should now be written as t ( m ; ). With ex post signals, it is not obvious whether the planner should ignore the message m when making matching decisions. This is because the planner can now impose large …nes on …rms that report types m that are unlikely given , which should improve the planner's ability to induce incumbents to truthfully reveal information.
Do ex post signals eliminate the ‡ipping property? This question cannot be answered without specifying the information structure induced by the signal . Consider for example an information structure under which …rms'payo¤s were perfectly observable. The planner could then propose a mechanism that mimics an "integrated …rm"by o¤ering incumbents a transfer that is identical to the poachers'payo¤. This mechanism implements the …rst-best allocation. The interesting cases are thus those in which is not perfectly correlated with …rms' payo¤s, that is, cases in which the signal produces non-fully revealing information structures.
For arbitrary information structures, little can be said. Here we consider an example with a simple but rich information structure: a signal 2 f1; :::; ng that partitions the interval We can now show the following:
Proposition 3 (The Conditional Flipping Property) Suppose there is an ex post signal 2 f1; :::; ng that partitions the interval [ ; ] into n sets 1 ; :::; n . Then, the ‡ipping property applies for each set , 2 f1; :::; ng: For any implementable allocation p, if
00 ) for some 0 ; 00 2 , then it must be that 0 < 00 .
Proof. The planner can always force an incumbent to reveal the set that contains the true by o¤ering a transfer function such that t (
an incumbent always knows the set that contains the true , the incumbent avoids such in…nite …nes by always reporting some 0 in . Conditional on observing , the planner can only distinguish between any two types 0 ; 00 2 by relying on the incumbent's message.
Thus, the planner's problem with an ex post signal is equivalent to choosing an allocation p for each possible set , 2 f1; :::; ng. By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition
Noticing that p ( ) = p ( ) for 2 , 2 f1; :::; ng, completes the proof.
We conclude that public signals do not eliminate the ‡ipping property, which continues to hold conditionally for all those types that cannot be separated by the signal alone. As the signal becomes more informative, PAM allocations become possible precisely because information asymmetries are exogenously reduced: The signal eventually reveals some information that was initially private. However, in all cases in which information asymmetries persist and are not fully eliminated with time, the ‡ipping property holds.
Decentralized Equilibrium
Here we consider a decentralized equilibrium version of the model. We make no important additional assumptions except for a no-bonding assumption: A worker is free to work for the highest bidder, and the current employer receives no compensation if the worker is poached by another …rm. In such a market, an incumbent can only retain its worker by paying more than a competitor.
This assumption perhaps needs further elaboration. The solution to the planner's problem makes it clear that talent misallocation in general does not depend on this assumption, nor does the ‡ipping property in particular. Allowing for bonding contracts will thus not restore e¢ ciency. In fact, banning bonding contracts is sometimes e¢ cient (see Remark 2 above).
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The reason that we rule out contracts that bind workers to …rms is that we want our model to be di¤erent from an asset market model under private information. Note that, in the planner's problem, it makes no di¤erence whether is an attribute of a worker or of a physical asset. However, in a decentralized equilibrium, this distinction is important: If the incumbent …rm "owns" a worker of type , only excessive retention ("too little trade") can be observed. Since Akerlof (1970) , this is a well understood result, to which we add by showing that too little trade is partly a consequence of the enforcement of ownership rights.
Our contribution, however, is to study the less well understood case of "too much trade."
The assumption of unrestricted labor mobility distinguishes our model from models of trading of physical assets under asymmetric information. However, it should be clear that the reason for the lack of PAM is the incumbents'incentive-compatibility constraint, and that such a result holds even when bonding contracts are allowed, as illustrated by the planner's problem.
Setup
We retain the same setup as described in Section 2: a continuum of …rms, with two types L and H, which di¤er from each other only because of their pro…tability parameter i 2 f1; g, and a continuum of agents in excess supply. All …rms and agents live for two periods.
At t = 0, each …rm hires a worker from the outside pool. Because all workers are ex ante identical, i.e. their types are distributed according to F , the initial pairing of …rms and workers is random. For each type i 2 fl; hg ; we use subscripts ji to denote a unique …rm j of type i. Each …rm ji o¤ers a wage w ji to a worker hired at t = 0. At the beginning of t = 1, this wage can be revised (upwards or downwards) based on the information that …rms have at that time. Wages are always paid at the end of each period, conditional on the worker having stayed with the …rm for that period.
Wage determination at t = 0 is a trivial problem. If there are no constraints on transfers from workers, …rms will choose a negative wage to extract all future expected surplus from workers. If instead there is limited liability, for example, if wages cannot be negative, then this constraint will bind and wages will be set at the lowest level possible. Because there is nothing interesting happening in t = 0, here we focus on characterizing the equilibrium in t = 1 only. In the Internet Appendix, we solve a fully dynamic version in which, among other things, we characterize wages at all periods.
At the beginning of t = 1, all players face the following timing: We now explain the game in more detail.
At Date 1, after observing their incumbent workers'types, each …rm j of type i simultaneously commits to a wage o¤er w ji 2 R to their incumbent workers. We permit strictly negative wage o¤ers, as these o¤ers will not be accepted, which implies that a negative wage o¤er is equivalent to dismissing the incumbent worker.
De…ne the set of retention wages for …rms of type L as W l = fw : w = w jl for some jl 2 Lg, and de…ne W h analogously. The set of all possible W i is the set W i .
At Date 2, …rms who have dismissed their workers (i.e., they have made negative wage o¤ers to their incumbent workers) now have vacancies, and will thus make poaching o¤ers
Without loss of generality, we restrict the analysis to the case in which only H …rms make poaching o¤ers. This restriction is not binding in equilibrium, because, for the same worker, H …rms would always make better o¤ers than L …rms. Thus, we impose this restriction only to simplify the notation.
Importantly, poachers do not observe the incumbent workers'types. Instead, they form beliefs regarding these types after observing W . Poachers believe that the unconditional distribution of is F (:). 22 We assume that all poachers share the same beliefs, whether on or o¤ any equilibrium path, which is a usual assumption in sequential games with incomplete information that use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as a solution concept. Thus, we denote by F W ( j w; i) the common belief about that poachers hold after observing a worker who has an o¤er of w from a …rm of type i, when the set of all o¤ers to workers is W .
Let ! i (w) denote the set of incumbent workers in …rms of type i who hold o¤er w. We assume that each poacher can make an o¤er (a poaching wage) w p jh (w; i) to all workers in set ! i (w). We will also write the poaching wage as w p jh (w; i; W ) whenever we wish to emphasize that poaching wages are equilibrium strategies, and as such, they depend on the set of all observed wages W .
Because of Assumption A1, "poachable" workers are in short supply, thus if we assume -as we do -that poachers compete among themselves in Bertrand fashion, no poacher can have a payo¤ larger than the outside payo¤ (recall that only type H …rms are poachers).
After observing the set of o¤ers, W , a poacher o¤ers
to all workers in the set ! i (w). 23 As above, if w p jh (w; i; W ) < 0, the o¤er is not accepted, which means that a negative poaching wage o¤er is equivalent to no o¤er. Because the right-hand side of (10) doesn't depend on jh, for simplicity we now drop this subscript from function w p .
At Date 3, workers always agree to work for the maximum non-negative wage that is o¤ered to them. We make the following assumption:
Assumption A2 A worker in ! i (w) accepts all o¤ers where w p (w; i) > w and rejects all o¤ers where w p (w; i) w.
In other words, if indi¤erent, a worker stays with her current employer, which is a standard assumption in the literature (see, e.g., Waldman, 1984) . However, this assumption entails some loss of generality, because it eliminates a number of equilibria in mixed strategies. Thus, we consider Assumption A2 as an equilibrium selection criterion with intuitive properties: Workers may have a small bias against changing jobs because of unmodeled costs.
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Comments on timing and assumptions. The timing assumes that incumbent …rms move before poachers. Changing the timing such that incumbent …rms move after poachers and make the …nal o¤er makes retention easier, but does not fundamentally a¤ect the qualitative properties of the equilibrium.
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There are only two dates when meaningful decisions are made: Dates 1 and 2, i.e., when incumbent …rms and poachers, respectively, choose their actions. 26 We only consider pure strategies at Date 1, but this is without loss of generality; the continuum assumption allows for mixing at the population level. The assumption that poachers only play pure strategies at Date 2 is also without loss of generality because of Assumption A2.
The assumption that an incumbent …rm makes an o¤er to its worker is meant to imply that workers have no bargaining power vis-à-vis incumbent …rms; workers either accept their …rms'o¤ers or move elsewhere. Alternatively, there could also be multiple rounds of o¤ers and counter-o¤ers by incumbents and poachers. We assume a single round as a simple way of introducing costs of delayed negotiations.
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We assume that the continuation game beginning at Date 3 must be in equilibrium regardless of the history of play, and that if w p (w; i; W ) > w, each poacher is matched with a worker with equal probability (i.e., we assume random rationing). 24 Relaxing this assumption makes mixed-strategy equilibria possible. A complete characterization and discussion of mixed-strategy equilibria can be found in the Internet Appendix.
25 A complete analysis of the case in which incumbents move last can be found in the Internet Appendix. 26 At Date 4, there is no meaningful choice because both incumbent …rms and poachers are strictly better o¤ by hiring a worker from the outside pool than by keeping a job post un…lled. Date 3 is when workers who hold (potentially multiple) o¤ers choose whether to stay or leave. This decision is not strategic. 27 Alternatively, we could also consider a situation in which there are potentially in…nite rounds of o¤ers and counter-o¤ers, in which each additional round introduces a cost paid by the incumbent (equivalently, the incumbent discounts the future). Because poachers are competitive, the incumbent may face a di¤erent bidder for its worker in each round. In this modi…ed game, the incumbent would immediately o¤er either the wage that would retain the worker or any wage that would not lead to retention.
Symmetric Information
In this subsection, we brie ‡y discuss the benchmark case of symmetric information.
Suppose that all …rms have the same information. Suppose a type H …rm has a vacancy at Date 2 (that is, at Date 1, it dismissed its incumbent worker). We call such a …rm a poacher. Poachers compete à la Bertrand for each type 2 [0; ]. Their pro…ts must equal their outside payo¤ . Thus, the poaching wage o¤ered to type is given by
where the superscript S denotes symmetric information.
In a subgame perfect equilibrium, incumbent …rm ji solves max w2R ji (w), where
Suppose …rst that ji . In this case, …rm i does not have to worry about poaching and will pay w ji = 0 if ji 2 [ ; ] and some w ji < 0 if ji < (in other words, it dismisses the worker).
If instead ji > and …rm ji wants to retain a worker, then the …rm must o¤er at least as much as a poacher, that is, w ji must be equal to or greater than
, which implies that this is an optimal choice if and only if i ji ( ji ) i . If i = h, this condition holds always, thus implying that, in equilibrium, no worker is poached from an H …rm. An H …rm's optimal strategy regarding its incumbent worker is summarized by:
Now the analysis that follows refers to L …rms only. If
is true for any jl > (recall that > 1). If > 1, this condition holds for any
This reasoning implies that an L …rm's optimal strategy is to o¤er
where # is the critical type as de…ned in (2). Recall that, for simplicity, we always use closed intervals to denote the equilibrium sets of types.
In equilibrium, L …rms retain all types in ; # . Types that are lower than are …red and not poached. Types higher than # are poached in equilibrium. We conclude that the equilibrium of this game implements the …rst-best allocation as de…ned in (3).
Asymmetric Information 4.3.1. Equilibrium: De…nition
We now de…ne the equilibrium conditions under asymmetric information. Poachers'strategies are given by the function w p (w; i; W ), as de…ned in (10). We denote an incumbent …rm's strategy by w ji 2 R, and a given set of such strategies for each …rm type is denoted byw l fw jl : jl 2 Lg andw h fw jh : jh 2 Hg.
Recall that we de…ned the c.d.f. F W ( j w; i) as the common belief of poachers about the type of worker who is o¤ered w in …rm i when W is observed. Beliefs are given by a family of functions F W ( j w; i) de…ned for each W 2 W. We denote such a family of functions simply by F W . Workers'beliefs about their own types do not in ‡uence equilibrium outcomes, because (i) workers do not know more than outsiders and (ii) optimal worker behavior depends only on wage o¤ers, regardless of their beliefs. Thus we do not include workers'beliefs in the de…nition of the equilibrium.
Let ji (w ji ; w p (w ji ; i; W )) denote the expected payo¤ to …rm i if it chooses to o¤er w ji to its worker, while poachers play strategy w p (w; i; W ). Note …rst that this payo¤ does not depend directly on the strategies of other incumbent …rms or on poachers'beliefs F W ;
knowledge of the poaching wage w p (w ji ; i; W ) is su¢ cient for …rm ji to forecast its payo¤.
Second, note that …rm ji can compute ji (w ji ; w p (w ji ; i; W )) with no ambiguity because we assume that poaching wages w p (w ji ; i; W ) are given by (10) and are common knowledge.
Finally, because there is a continuum of …rms ji 2 L [ H, and a continuum of types 2 [0; ], for each set of pure strategiesw w l [w h , there is a unique W , which occurs with probability 1. The di¤erence betweenw and W is that the former keeps track of which …rms ji 2 L [ H made which o¤er, while the latter only contains those o¤ers made by each type of …rm, without distinguishing, within each type, among the …rms that made such o¤ers.
We denote the set of wages W induced by strategyw by W (w).
De…nition 4 A strategy pro…le (w; w p (w; i; W )) and a family of belief functions F W constitute an equilibrium of the game if (i) for each ji 2 L [ H, w ji 2w only if w ji 2 arg max w2R ji (w; w p (w; i; W (w)));
(ii) poaching wages w p (w; i; W ) are given by (10); and (iii) all poachers hold identical beliefs F W ( j w; i) for all w 2 W and all W 2 W.
These beliefs must be consistent with Bayes's rule for all w 2 W (w). Poachers believe that the incumbent …rms behave independently of one another, which speci…cally implies that, if
This de…nition is equivalent to a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Conditions (i)-
(ii) are the standard requirement that the equilibrium strategies are best responses to one another.
Condition (iii) not only requires that beliefs are updated by Bayes's rule whenever possible, but also imposes some additional weak restrictions on beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path.
As usual in PBE de…nitions with many players, we require all poachers to hold the same beliefs, both on and o¤ the equilibrium path. We also require that beliefs depend only on W , which is mostly for tractability. This is a slightly stronger restriction because it im-
One interpretation is that all incumbent …rms of the same type i are observationally identical; thus, they cannot be di¤erentiated by poachers when these …rms play the same wage w i in equilibrium.
Equilibrium: Characterization
To characterize the equilibium, we begin by making two additional simplifying assumptions to deal with equilibrium multiplicity. We …rst assume that an incumbent would never make an o¤er that is weakly dominated by making no o¤er:
We also assume the following:
Assumption E2 (Divinity) After observing an o¤-the-equilibrium-path wage w 0 , poachers believe that the probability that type 0 w 0 i + deviates is no less than the probability that type 00 > 0 deviates.
Assumption E2 is a technical assumption that restricts the set of admissible o¤-theequilibrium-path beliefs. This assumption is an adaptation to our setup of the Divinity
Criterion of Banks and Sobel (1987) . Assumption E2 is not particularly restrictive and is compatible with (in…nitely) many o¤-the-equilibrium beliefs; thus, it does not eliminate equilibrium multiplicity. None of our main conclusions depends on this assumption.
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The role of Assumptions E1 and E2 is to restrict the set of equilibria; thus, they may be interpreted as equilibrium selection criteria. They simplify the analysis signi…cantly, although they do not eliminate equilibrium multiplicity.
We now state some preliminary results.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, all workers retained by a type-i …rm are o¤ered the same wage.
This important result has a very simple proof. Suppose that there are two types, 0 and 00 , where 00 > 0 . Suppose that the incumbent wishes to retain both types. Suppose also that w 00 > w 0 (the argument is analogous if w 00 < w 0 ). This situation cannot be an equilibrium because there is a pro…table deviation for an incumbent with worker 00 . Indeed, the incumbent prefers to o¤er w 0 to a worker of type 00 . Type 00 would nonetheless be retained, but at a lower wage.
Lemma 2 Any equilibrium must have a threshold property: If type 0 is retained by an incumbent in equilibrium, type 00 > 0 must also be retained in equilibrium.
28 The intuition for Assumption E2 is as follows. For concreteness, suppose that type 00 is retained by an L …rm in an equilibrium with wage w 00 , while type 0 2 [w 0 + ; 00 ) is not retained (the intuition for the other cases is analogous to this example). An incumbent with a worker of type 00 that deviates and o¤ers this type wage w 0 can only bene…t from the deviation if poachers o¤er w p (w 0 ) w 0 . However, for this set of poaching wages, type 0 would also bene…t from a deviation. On the other hand, type 00 would be worse o¤ if w p (w 0 ) > w 0 , whereas type 0 would not be worse o¤. Thus, the logic of Banks and Sobel's Divinity Criterion requires that the probability of 0 deviating should be no less than that of 00 deviating. This is again easily proven: For a given retention wage, w, if it is optimal to retain 0 (i 0 w i ), then it is also optimal to retain any such that 0 .
Lemma 2 is a manifestation of the ‡ipping property and, as such, is a consequence of the incumbent's informational advantage.
We now prove the following proposition:
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Proposition 4 An equilibrium exists. All equilibria have the following properties:
1. There is a unique~ i 2 [ ; ] such that, for each …rm type i 2 fl; hg, all types ~ i are retained. Threshold~ i is the same for all equilibria and is either or the least element of the set of …xed points of
is the wage o¤ered to retained workers whose types are greater than i . 
All types
and
Proof. See the Appendix. 29 In what follows, for simplicity, we de…ne all equilibrium sets of types as closed intervals. That is, we refrain from specifying what happens in equilibrium in the knife-edge cases in which an incumbent is indi¤erent between retaining or not retaining a type. The equilibrium is una¤ected by what happens in these cases.
This proposition shows that, in equilibrium, incumbent workers will …nd themselves in one of the following three situations: unemployed, employed by their incumbent …rm, or employed by a high productivity poacher. Part 1 of Proposition 4 implies that the very best workers will typically be retained by the incumbent …rm, which implies that if workers are retained at all, they must be the best workers. Because this is true even when the incumbent …rm has low productivity, the equilibrium will be ine¢ cient due to the lack of PAM.
Part 2 of Proposition 4 implies all types < are …red because the unemployment replacement value is higher. Part 3 implies that worker types in [ ;~ i ] are not retained by an incumbent i, and will be either …red or poached. Sets P i and S i are not pinned down because the incumbent is indi¤erent to how workers leave the …rm.
Only those workers with talent in the interval [ ;~ i ] may be poached in equilibrium.
With some abuse of language, we call these workers mediocre workers, although in some cases this interval will also contain the very best workers (e.g., if~ i is close to or equal to ).
Proposition 4 also reveals that equilibria di¤er from one another (meaningfully) only because the sets P i and S i may di¤er. 30 Because we focus on the e¢ ciency properties of the equilibria, it is natural to select the most e¢ cient equilibrium as the focal equilibrium:
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Corollary 2 There is a most-e¢ cient equilibrium in which
We prove the existence of this equilibrium in the proof of Proposition 4. This equilibrium is the most e¢ cient one because any other equilibrium must have either some 0 < who is poached or some 0 > who is …red, or both. In the former case, allocational e¢ ciency can be improved by …ring 0 . In the latter case, allocational e¢ ciency can be improved by letting poachers hire 0 .
In the most e¢ cient equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome changes monotonically with :
As increases, outcomes change from unemployment to poaching, and then from poaching to retention. Note that the most-e¢ cient decentralized equilibrium implements a NAM 30 Two observationally equivalent equilibria with the same P i and S i may also di¤er from one another because they are sustained by di¤erent beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path and may display di¤erent wages o¤ered by incumbent …rms for types in P i . 31 An alternative re…nement would be to focus on equilibria in which the incumbent …rm only …res workers with abilities less than . This requirement has intuitive properties; the incumbent o¤ers zero wage to mediocre workers and retains them with a vanishingly small probability (i.e., only if poachers "tremble"and do not make o¤ers). Although our results would remain basically unchanged, except for the elimination of ine¢ cient …ring, under such a re…nement, equilibrium existence is not always guaranteed and may depend on distributional assumptions. allocation, whenever workers from L …rms are poached by H …rms, and is thus a third-best allocation.
To focus on the most interesting case, in the remainder of this paper, we assume that the following condition holds:
Under Condition G, there is an interior~ i < such that all types i 2 [~ i ; ] are retained by i incumbents. Condition G always holds for any set of parameters if ! 1. If Condition G does not hold, incumbent …rms never retain any worker in equilibrium, i.e.,~ i = .
Equilibrium: E¢ ciency
The most-e¢ cient equilibrium implies that types l 2 [~ l ; ] are retained by incumbents of type L and l 2 [ ;~ l ] are poached. That is, the most-e¢ cient decentralized equilibrium implements a (deterministic) NAM allocation. By contrast, allocational e¢ ciency requires a PAM allocation, as in (3). Thus, the most e¢ cient equilibrium does not lead to an e¢ cient allocation of talent, which is formally stated in the next corollary. The corollary above shows that the possibility of poaching creates three distortions relative to the …rst-best scenario. Incumbent …rms do not attempt to retain some workers who are potential poaching targets, which leads to excessive turnover. Such turnover results in misallocation of talent because some workers who have acquired …rm-speci…c skills are either ine¢ ciently …red (Case 1) or ine¢ ciently poached by high-pro…tability …rms (Case 2). Thus, the equilibrium displays a " Peter Principle Property": Mediocre workers are "promoted"to positions in better …rms, whereas the best workers stay with their current employers. This is a key empirical prediction of the model, and an illustration of the ‡ipping property. Finally, low-productivity …rms might be too successful in retaining workers who would otherwise be matched with better …rms in the …rst-best allocation. In other words, there might be too little poaching in equilibrium (Case 3).
Comparative Statics
To perform comparative statics, we focus on two parameters with intuitive interpretations.
The …rst is , which could be interpreted as the (cross-sectional) dispersion in …rm profitability (or revenue). Because …rm pro…tability in reality may be positively related to …rm survival and growth, can also be interpreted as a measure of heterogeneity in …rm size.
The second parameter, , measures the importance of general skills relative to …rm-speci…c skills. Alternatively, an increase in can also be interpreted as a decrease in the cost of recruiting a new worker (e.g., search costs).
It's immediate from (15) and (16) that has no e¤ect on e h . However, does a¤ect~ l .
Under Condition G,~ l is the least …xed point of
By the implicit function theorem, we have
In other words, the retention threshold for L …rms increases with the pro…tability dispersion parameter . Intuitively, as L and H …rms become more heterogeneous, L …rms …nd it increasingly more di¢ cult to retain workers, and are thus only able to retain the very best workers. This result also means that job mobility increases with , because the set of poached workers [ ;~ l ] increases with~ l . This increase in mobility can be either e¢ cient or ine¢ cient.
For example, if~ l < # , then increasing leads to more ine¢ cient poaching.
The e¤ect of the importance of general skills relative to …rm-speci…c skills is also easily inferred from
Both retention thresholds increase with the relative importance of general skills . Again, this result is intuitive: There is more poaching when general skills are more important (i.e., if skills are more portable). Therefore, an increase in also increases job mobility. An increase in poaching from H …rms is always ine¢ cient. An increase in poaching from L …rms may be either e¢ cient or ine¢ cient.
Our model also has predictions for wages. Consider for example w i (~ l ), which is the wage paid to workers retained by L …rms. From (16) and (18) we have
If a worker is …rst hired with a zero wage (as it would happen if, for example, they could not be paid negative wages), then w i (~ ) measures the increase in earnings for those workers who are retained by their …rms. This result shows that within-job earnings growth increases in the dispersion of …rm payo¤s.
Applications and Implications
Here we discuss some applications and novel positive and normative implications of our model.
Mutual fund managers
One of the key predictions of our analysis is that internally promoted workers (i.e., workers who are retained by their …rms) are more talented than externally promoted workers (i.e., workers who are poached and promoted to higher-level positions). This implication is unique to models in which employers are better informed about the talent of their workers. Ours is the …rst model in the asymmetric employer learning literature in which …rms may rationally poach mediocre workers from other …rms.
This prediction should only apply to industries in which asymmetric information about talent is important. An industry that …ts this description is the mutual fund industry. The main task of mutual fund managers is to construct and manage stock portfolios. As a regulated industry, US mutual funds are required to disclose their portfolio holdings quarterly.
This means that all changes in portfolio holdings between two disclosure dates remain private information to the …rm.
It is di¢ cult for outsiders to assess the skill of mutual fund managers. Fund performance is a very noisy measure of stock-picking and market timing skill because of the di¢ culty of separating true skill from luck. Nevertheless, there is evidence that some mutual fund managers have skill and are thus able to command higher fees (see, e.g., Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015) . Mutual fund executives have an advantage over outsiders when evaluating their managers because, unlike outsiders, they can observe all of their managers'choices (i.e., portfolio changes) and their explanations.
Berk, van Binsbergen, and Liu (forthcoming) …nd that mutual fund …rms are able to identify their best managers, who are then internally "promoted" (i.e., they are allocated more assets to manage). Such internal promotions appear to add value to the company. By contrast, managers who are externally promoted -i.e., they are poached by other mutual funds and experience an increase in assets under management -do not appear to add much value. The authors conclude that their evidence indicates that mutual fund executives have private information about their managers, and that this information is useful for allocating capital to managers.
Our model provides a possible explanation for the most puzzling aspect of this evidence, which is the fact that mutual fund …rms hire outsiders who deliver mediocre results. In our model, poacher …rms understand that workers who are let go are mediocre, but these workers are still preferable to workers of whom we know very little. A normative implication of our analysis is that external promotions are socially ine¢ cient in these cases, which suggests that mutual fund manager mobility is excessive.
The software industry The assumptions of our model …t well with innovative industries, where talent is crucial but di¢ cult to measure. Andersson et al. (2009) study compensation patterns in a number of sectors of the software industry. They …nd that sectors in which there is more dispersion in potential payo¤s o¤er higher earnings growth for those employees who are retained by their …rms. In our model, the dispersion in potential payo¤s is measured by the pro…tability di¤erential parameter . From (20), we see that within-job earnings growth is higher in sectors with larger .
Non-compete clauses Contractual clauses that forbid workers to quit and work for competitors are common in a number of high-skill occupations. Such non-compete clauses typically impose a quarantine period before a worker can join another …rm in the same industry and/or geographical region.
Non-compete clauses o¤er an imperfect solution to the problem of excess mobility, because they are of limited duration, and because the de…nitions of both the applicable industry and geographical area may be fuzzy in practice. Furthermore, non-compete clauses are controversial and have often been challenged in courts. For example, in California noncompete clauses are considered void and non-enforceable, except in a small set of cases.
Our analysis reveals that non-compete clauses can be socially ine¢ cient, justifying their restriction in some cases. In sectors or industries with substantial …rm heterogeneity (i.e., high ), both # (the critical type) and k are low, making it more likely that the secondbest allocation involves poaching of all types (see Proposition 2). Intuitively, when …rm heterogeneity is high, preventing workers from moving from low-productivity …rms to highproductivity …rms is very ine¢ cient. However, if non-compete clauses are available, lowproductivity …rms may use them to avoid poaching. Although it might be rational for workers and …rms to write such contracts, the parties involved do not internalize the negative e¤ects of mobility restrictions on high-productivity …rms that have vacancies. Information asymmetry is the friction that makes non-compete agreements ine¢ cient.
Conclusions
We show that adverse selection in the labor market may generate (ine¢ cient) negative assortative matching of workers and …rms. To the best of our knowledge, this is a new result.
It is also a somewhat unexpected result. Although it is not surprising that informational asymmetries generate ine¢ ciencies, it is not obvious that such ine¢ ciencies can fully o¤set the tendency for the best …rms to hire only the best workers, especially if there are strong technological complementarities between talent and …rm quality. Previous research has emphasized the fact that adverse selection in the labor market implies insu¢ cient job mobility for high-ability workers (e.g., Greenwald, 1986) . We show that there can be too much job mobility for mediocre workers.
Our results also illustrate how labor markets di¤er from asset markets. A simple asset market under adverse selection never displays too much trade. Our model makes the reason for this result clear: The institution of asset ownership forces buyers to compensate sellers fairly in asset exchanges, which prevents the poaching of assets against the seller's will. In contrast, too much (i.e., ine¢ cient) "trade" in labor markets may arise precisely because labor cannot be owned by …rms, and because contracts that mimic ownership of labor are rare.
A. Appendix: Omitted Proofs can be weakly increased by (pointwise) replacing p ( 0 ) with p # for all 0 2 b ; # (recall that p must be non-increasing because of Proposition 1). By the same argument, if 00 2 # ; , the planner can increase surplus by replacing p ( 00 ) with p # . Thus the optimal allocation must be a matching-free allocation p ( ) = c, with surplus
where Q is a constant given by
The optimal choice of c will depend on the last term of function (22), which can be rewritten as
which implies that the optimal choice of c is c = 8 < :
Now, if c = 0, the optimal b is , because an incumbent is better o¤ retaining any type above than hiring from the outside pool. If c = 1, the optimal b is , because an H …rm with a vacancy is better o¤ employing any type above than hiring from the outside pool.
Thus, the optimal mechanism requires either c = 0 and b = or c = 1 and b = . The mechanism that implements c = 1 (all workers above poached) is optimal if
which can be rewritten as
(1 F ( ))
The result then follows by de…ning
This condition requires the existence of at least one 00 >~ i w p (w i ) i + such that its probability of deviation is strictly greater than that of some type 0 2 (~ i ; 00 ). However, this is ruled out by Assumption E2. Thus, w i = w p (w i ).
Next, we show that~ i is unique. De…ne the function
Clearly, the existence of an equilibrium with retention requires this function to be non- 
Clearly,~ i . At~ i , the incumbent is just indi¤erent between retaining the worker for w i or …ring the worker:~
To show that this threshold is part of an equilibrium, notice …rst that because G i (0) > 0, i G i ( i ) crosses zero from below at~ i , which is also a necessary condition for an equilibrium. We only need to show that no other >~ i can be an equilibrium. To see this, suppose that there is 0 >~ i such that only types > 0 are retained at wage
Then, an incumbent with type~ i + ", with " > 0 arbitrarily small, could deviate and o¤er w i < w 0 , with
If type~ i + " is successfully retained after this deviation, then the incumbent is strictly better o¤. For such a deviation not to be pro…table, poachers' beliefs must be such that w p (w i ) > w i . However, again, this could only be true if there were some type 00 >~ i whose probability of deviation is strictly greater than that of a type 2 (~ i ; 00 ). This is ruled out by Assumption E2. Thus,~ i is uniquely determined as the least …xed point of G i ( If we instead have max l 2[0; ) l G l ( l ) 0, nothing is change for h …rms. For l …rms, no type l is retained, and an equilibrium in which all types l are o¤ered w l = 0, and types below are …red, exists and is sustained by beliefs such that F ( j w l + ) for any w l that is o¤ the equilibrium path. This equilibrium implies P l = [ ; ] and S l = [ ; ] :
